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Abstract 
How artifacts come to persist is a neglected area in organizational theory. In IS, Lucas 
et al. (2007) stress implementation research that takes the long view, but little is known 
about maintenance practices. Using Lawrence et al. (2009) institutional work 
framework, we analyze stakeholder efforts to stabilize and now maintain the Urban-
net, a broadband network. We track it from inception through design stabilization to 
post-stabilization. Empirically, we add to research on the neglected area of 
maintenance work. Re: theory, our contributions are two-fold. First, we distinguish 
artifact stabilization from maintenance, a distinction Lawrence et al. (2009) ignore. 
Bijker’s (1997) idea of stabilization offers a way to think about the two. The temporal 
and relational scope of the effort involved, we show, can be different. Second, we adapt 
the term gardening from Olsen (2003) to characterize the multi-stranded nature of 
maintenance, involving efforts to preserve while also amending the Urban-net. 
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Introduction 
How do artifacts come to persist over time? The persistence of artifacts cannot be taken for granted. The 
emerging research on institutional work keys the importance of tracking artifacts and actions involved in 
creating, maintaining, and disrupting them. This research, specifically the part about maintenance work, 
is key to the present paper. Lawrence et al. (2001) note that even stable artifacts -- governance structures, 
technologies, rules – “require the active involvement of individuals and organizations in order to maintain 
them over time”. Entropy, in other words, is always a threat and must be overcome by purposive action. 
However, empirical research on the work required to maintain artifacts is relatively scarce in sociological 
institutional and organization theorizing (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). In the IS literature, Lucas et al. 
(2007) emphasize implementation research that takes the long view, “long after systems are first adopted 
and receive initial acceptance”, but little is known about maintenance work. 
 
We present a close-to-the-ground look at the efforts of stakeholders first to stabilize and then to maintain 
the Urban-net, an advanced information and communications technology (ICT) community network. This 
longitudinal case study tracks Urban-net over many years, from inception through design stabilization in 
2000 to the post-stabilization work of maintaining, which is ongoing in the Urban-net Board of Directors. 
 
We review the sociological institutionalist and organizational theorizing on institutional work below. We 
then profile the project and analyze the social process of stabilization. Actions that stabilized the design - 
stabilization occurring when the technology for building Urban-net’s network infrastructure was specified 
and frozen from further major change - included actions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) call institution-
creating practices. The middle section tracks the Board’s maintenance work. The concluding section pulls 
together our contributions to the institutional work literature. Empirically, we add to the sparse literature 
on the important but neglected area of maintenance work (Lawrence et al. 2009). On the theory front, we 
differentiate stabilization from maintenance. Maintenance must be “distinguished from simple stability”, 
assert (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) without elaborating on the differences. We differentiate the two on 
the temporal and relational scope of the work involved, and offer gardening as a metaphor to characterize 
the multi-stranded nature of maintenance work. 
Theorizing Institutions 
Sociological institutional theory has “become a dominant explanatory mechanism for organizations” 
(Greenwood et al. 2008). In an influential edited book, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) described the “new” 
institutionalism (hereafter institutionalism) and its concern with “institutions as independent variables”. 
Institutions are cultural abstractions (values, rules) which underpin “visible structures and routines of 
organizations” (Scott 2001). As independent variables, they constitute organizations: their very identity 
and mission, approved practices. By embodying prevailing institutions, organizations gain legitimacy. 
  
Every institution has a central logic that organizes its core principles (Friedland and Alford 1991). Logics 
link actors and principles by providing prescriptive “symbolic resources and material practices” to guide 
everyday cognition and action. Institutions like the market, state, Democracy have central logics, which 
 
“(are) the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values… 
rules by which individuals produce and reproduce” social reality (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). 
 
Institutions persist only through human action, and logics provide cultural resources to enable approved 
ways of thinking and acting. But logics can also constrain actors normatively, serving as a means of social 
control. Logics can become taken-for-granted over time, with actors routinely reproducing them – and the 
organizations that embody them - without question or conscious thought (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
 Venkatesh & Natarajan / Institutional Work and Technology Artifacts 
  
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 3 
 
Institutionalism’s “theoretical distinctiveness” (Tolbert and Zucker 1983) stems from the key role given to 
culture in organizations. Logics do not merely influence, they constitute (Scott 2001). Institutional effects 
are constitutive, meaning that organizations’ and individuals’ interests, values, norms, their very identity 
as social operatives, these are all created by logics and institutionally-embedded. Logics are not out there 
but do their normative work from “within the human mind” in this sense, in the “subjective structure of 
consciousness” itself (Scott 1987). And because logics work at the level of consciousness, alternative ways 
of being are hard to imagine. Taken-for-granted logics are apt to be seen as objective and natural features 
of the social order. Their subjective origins in human action become obscured. 
 
Institutionalists’ understanding of institutions as “independent variables” constituting actors and actions 
stems from a structuralist view of social life, but it begs the question: if actors can only enact the status 
quo, how do organizations ever change?  Are actors doomed to reproduce approved order-affirming action 
scripts, or do have the capacity to change scripts and act in order-challenging ways? DiMaggio (1988) saw 
the limitation, the “meta-physical pathos”, of a stance “that denies the reality of purposive, interest-driven 
action”. The institutional work literature is a development of the institutionalist recognition that actors, as 
adaptive, thinking beings, are capable of acting as well as enacting, of questioning and challenging taken-
for-granted assumptions as much as reproducing them. But where does this capacity come from? 
 
The impetus to question taken-for-granted assumptions can arise from internal contradictions in culture 
itself. Culture must be seen not as a coherent whole but as a repertoire, a “toolkit” that is not necessarily 
internally-consistent (DiMaggio 1997). Organizations are liable to be concurrently embedded in multiple 
logics and operate in diverse spheres of society, each of which may focalize a variety of values, norms and 
interests. Some of these logics may be industry-wide, and others organization-specific. Some of these may 
be primary, defining the core mission, and others not as definitive (McAdam and Scott 2005). These may 
co-exist harmoniously in times of equilibrium as a result of a truce among competing logics (Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2005). But the truce is provisional. Macro-social changes (societal-level transformation, new 
regulatory pressures, major market shifts) may highlight internal contradictions and provide the impetus 
to question taken-for-granted ways of being and acting. Even long-lived organizations can harbor internal 
cultural tensions that can trigger change (Seo and Creed 2002). 
 
This would be true for individuals too. Actors are socialized in a plurality of logics from the variety of roles 
they take on - as manager, professional, Democrat. Even members of the same organization, congruently 
socialized in its primary logics, can differ from differences in their occupational socialization, for example. 
They may as a result host inconsistent sets of “symbolic constructions and material practices”(Friedland 
and Alford 1991). At times of organizational stress, “in response to particular contextual cues”(DiMaggio 
1997), actors may abandon shared logics in favor of a hither-to secondary logic (McAdam and Scott 2005) 
in an effort at change. Contradictions “inherent in the differentiated set of logics” can provide the impetus, 
and the tool-kit the rhetorical and action resources, for effecting change (Thornton and Ocasio 2008).    
The emerging theory of institutional work sees the link between institutional logic and action as recursive. 
Lawrence et al. (2009) elaborate: 
 
“Most central to our definition of institutional work is its “direction”. If one thinks of institutions 
and actions as existing in recursive relationship, in which institutions provide templates for action 
…and action affects those templates, then we are centrally concerned…with the second arrow, that 
from action to institutions” (p. 7).       
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Institutional Work: Creating, Maintaining, Disrupting 
Institutional work is “purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining, 
and disrupting institutions…(T)ogether these categories describe a rough life-cycle of institutional work...” 
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, p.2).  The verb form (creating, maintaining, disrupting) is important to 
note, emphasizing material activities, not achieved states. This emphasis on what actors actually do is “at 
the core of the study of institutional work”(Lawrence et al. 2009). Institutions are seen as dependent 
variables subject to human action. 
 
“This is an important shift for institutional studies of organizations because, despite the injection 
of actors and agency…relatively little is known about the concrete practices employed by actors in 
relation to institutions” (Lawrence et al. 2009, p.10). 
 
This shift endows actors with “awareness, skill, and reflexivity”. Actors socialized in a plurality of logics 
are assumed to be “skilled users of culture” (Swidler 1986) with a capacity to match roles and situations to 
appropriate action scripts in their tool-kit. Emphasizing “choice within and among cultural models or rule 
systems suggests that actors… not be regarded as helpless puppets” (Scott 2001). If routine enactment of 
approved organizational scripts assumes a degree of automaticity and passivity, modeling actors as active 
and engaged assumes a “reflexive…self-controlled form of thought”(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Actors 
are far from being cultural dopes. Herein lies the possibility for organizational change. 
 
Sociologists and organizational theorists have called for a nuanced appreciation of the contingent nature 
of human action (Battilana and D'Aunno 2009; Emirbayer and Mische 1998), and this research informs 
institutional work research. Some institutionalists (e.g., DiMaggio 1988), correcting for the “metaphysical 
pathos”, offered a conceptualization of the institutional entrepreneur -- a strategic, calculating actor who 
effectively mobilizes support for her (or allies’) interests. This was useful in the present case, as we show, 
where Urban-net stakeholders we call entrepreneurs successfully stabilized the network design in favor of 
certain stakeholders and against project aims by establishing a new defining logic for the project. But this 
conceptualization was less useful to describe the mundane work of maintenance. Institutional work, note 
Lawrence et al. (2009), could be 
 
“highly visible and dramatic, as often illustrated in institutional entrepreneurship, but much of it 
nearly invisible and often mundane, as in the day-to-day adjustments, adaptations, and 
compromises of actors attempting to maintain institutional arrangements” (p. 9). 
 
Table 1: Life Cycle of Institutional Work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) 
Institutional Work Examples of Associated Practices 
A. Creating Institutions Rule constructing, Advocating, Defining, Vesting 
B. Maintaining Institutions Supporting rule compliance, Embedding/Routinizing, Valorizing 
C. Disrupting Institutions Rule repudiating 
 
From a review of institutionalism and organization theory, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) identify action 
types for creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions (Table 1). Institution-creating actions include 
construction of rules. Maintenance work “involves supporting, repairing or recreating social mechanisms 
that ensure compliance” with rules. Actors disrupt institutions by rejecting rules and by not reproducing 
“previously legitimated or taken-for-granted… actions” (Oliver 1992). Taken together, actors’ purposive 
actions in creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions describe a life-cycle of institutional work. 
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Empirically, the research on creating institutions (including institutional entrepreneurship) exceeds that 
on maintenance. Institutions are simply assumed to persist. The reality is that institutional persistence is 
not a given nor is reproduction automatic. Even established, long-lived institutions, like Democracy in the 
West, still requires occasional interventions to ensure that elections, for example, are conducted properly 
and that democratic norms are upheld by election officials, candidates, voters. The reproduction of those 
norms in the actual practices of these actors cannot be assumed. This powers the argument for studying, 
indeed for emphasizing, the work required to maintain artifacts: 
 
“We clearly need to focus more attention on the ways in which institutions reproduce themselves. 
Indeed, this may be a more fundamental question for institutional research, in many respects, 
than the question of how institutions are created” (p. 45).  
 
Maintenance is different from “simple stability”, argue Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) without elaborating 
on how they may be different. Theoretically, this remains a gray area in institutional work. We believe it is 
important to distinguish stabilization from the work of maintaining that which has been stabilized. What 
requires maintenance, and what motivates ongoing maintenance work, arguably, is some stabilized set of 
specifications that stakeholders have invested in and are interested in preserving against entropy: be it a 
network design, organizational by-laws and governance structures, service contracts, and the values and 
norms that these instruments embody. Based on the present research, which outlines the process leading 
to stabilization and provides an account of maintenance work, and drawing on the social construction of 
technology (SCOT) literature (Bijker 1997), we offer a theoretical differentiation of the two.  
 
Bijker’s (1997) process model starts by assuming that artifacts are “interpretively flexible”. Different social 
groups may interpret the artifact according to their distinctive interests. At some point, though, one group 
(or some sub-set of groups) prevails and their interpretation becomes definitive. Stabilization, the point in 
time when a definitive interpretation emerges and is “frozen” from further major change, could stem from 
consensus (or acquiescence or coercion) among groups. At this point the artifact’s interpretive flexibility is 
reduced (Bijker 1997). The idea of “institutional settlement” (Zysman 1994), which is roughly analogous, 
refers to a negotiated agreement among contending parties (Levy and Scully 2007). 
 
By definition, stabilization and settlement denote achieved states. We found the term gardening, adapted 
from Olsen’s work on political constitutions (2003), useful to describe maintenance work - work required 
to maintain the achieved state. Maintenance involves ongoing work (Jarzabkowski et al. 2009; Lawrence 
and Suddaby 2006). The temporal scope of maintenance work is ongoing; stabilization is an event. As on 
ongoing effort, gardening in the present case is about maintaining valued aspects of the stabilized artifact 
(Urban-net’s network infrastructure, built from design specifications stabilized in 2000) while amending 
others. Gardening is amending while preserving. Persistence cannot be assumed because user defections 
remain a possibility. Assuring persistence is therefore necessary, but Urban-net actors are also working to 
reactivate the project’s equity logic, a logic that was sidelined and deferred in the process of stabilization. 
Grammatically, echoing the verb form emphasized in Lawrence et al. (2009) conception of institutional 
work, the emphasis of gardening is on the activity, and the tense is present continuous. 
 
The relational scope of maintenance work is also a point of difference. In the present case, stabilization 
resulted from mobilization of support within the committee for the consensus design, based on which the 
network infrastructure was built. Maintenance work involves construction of relational networks that are 
broader in scope and extend well beyond the Board. In their effort to honor equity and “serve the under-
served”, actors are working to increase the range of interests shaping the work of the Board. In their effort 
to avert defection, actors are reaching out to Internet Service Providers and Telco rivals to increase Urban 
-net’s value to users. Both these efforts (serving the poor and averting defections) are occurring within the 
terms of Telco service contracts and involve no change to core infrastructure of Urban-net. These efforts, 
directed at preserving while amending, we see as part of gardening work.       
Organization Theory, Strategy and Information System 
6 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
 
As analysts are starting to note, maintenance work can include elements of creating and disrupting work 
(e.g., Hargrave and Van de Ven 2009). Verbs like creating and disrupting, we believe, may be too strong 
to accurately describe what we saw in the resent case, unwittingly suggesting heroic, de novo, whole-cloth 
interventions. Radical, out-of-the-box thinking is occurring on the Board. One option being deliberated on 
Urban-net’s future form, for example, is complete autonomy from Telco. But the bulk of the deliberations, 
however, have centered on two more proximate concerns: keeping users from defecting and “serving the 
under-served”. Even the second, which, if fully realized, would evolve Urban-net in a new direction, would 
not entail any change to service contracts or the infrastructure. Actors are working with a modest canvas, 
and the thinking is inside-the-box, maintaining while amending. Amending has not involved “creating” a 
logic but reactivating equity. Gardening more appropriately describes the evolutionary and conservative 
nature of much of the maintenance work now occurring in the Board. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
As befitting exploratory inquiry of an emerging new research area, the predominant research approach in 
(Lawrence et al. 2009) edited volume on institutional work is the richly-contextualized interpretive case 
study using qualitative analysis. Lawrence et al. (2009) highlight the value of the case study for inductive, 
empirically-grounded insights into “actions of individual and organizational actors attempting to create, 
maintain, and disrupt institutions”. Early empirical research on institutional theory, concerned with the 
effects of institutions on actions, also relied on case studies for similar reasons. The case method offers 
some benefits for investigating organizational phenomena in situ. First, it can facilitate understanding of 
complex social processes, relying on triangulation – using surveys, ethnography (participant observation), 
interviews, and documentary analysis – to construct richly-textured and nuanced accounts. Second, in 
emerging areas like institutional work where the research terrain is only now being explored and mapped 
(Lawrence et al. 2009), the case method “encourages an open ended and investigative approach toward 
observations and the nature of the relations that link them”(Poteete et al. 2010). Detailed documentation 
of observations from a case can help to refine concepts and develop theory. The longitudinal case, used in 
this case, provides the added advantage of examining evolving phenomena and facilitating exploration of 
“the content and context of change over time” (Pettigrew 1990). The work of “creating, maintaining, and 
disrupting”, highlighting the verb form of these activities occurring over time, calls for just such a focus.   
Stabilization Process Dataset 
The first author collected data on the network planning and design process leading to design stabilization. 
Data collection occurred over 43 months (1997-2000) and covered planning (requirements analysis) and 
design of Urban-net network infrastructure. Multiple collection methods were used, including a planning 
survey in 1997. We relied on the first author’s participant notes from 13 design meetings (from mid-1998 
to May 2000, when design consensus emerged). Supplementing this data were interviews with 24 stake-
holders and others. Some were interviewed more than once. Sixty documents were reviewed (Table 2). 
Table 2: Stabilization Process Dataset  
Respondents and their Project Roles # of Interviewees # of Interviews 
Entrepreneurs 2 4 
Dissidents 3 6 
Telco Designers 3 9 
Selectors 6 6 
MIS Managers 5 4 (3individual; 1group of two) 
CBO Representatives 5 4 (3individual; 1group of two) 
Total 24 interviewees 33 interviews 
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The first author used concurrent data collection and analysis (Barrett and Walsham 1999). As the meeting 
notes accumulated, he began looking for themes and thematic clusters. He (re)read his meeting notes and 
coded instances of emergent themes. The coded strips were cut out and organized into clusters of themes. 
This process was repeated with interview and documentary data. The process ended when no new themes 
emerged. Time-ordering the coded data allowed tracking of events and transitions in the narrative outline 
below on how design stabilization came about (see Pettigrew 1990). 
Post-Stabilization Maintenance Dataset 
A top officer of the Urban-net (Executive Director) resigned in 2006. The in-coming Executive Director 
interviewed all Board members that year to better understand their needs and ideas for the Urban-net. 
His interviews were structured by ten questions. Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and were 
audio-recorded; all 17 audio files were made available to the first author. The first author used the same 
questions to structure his interviews (conducted 2006-2008) with the outgoing Executive Director, the 
Board Chair and technical officer. The second author interviewed the current Executive Director. Overall, 
we had data from 21 interviews. Additionally, we obtained minutes from twenty Board meetings (Table 3), 
the Executive Director’s audio recordings of these meetings, and the first author’s notes from ten of these 
meetings he attended as an at-large Board member. We used the same methods as above for data analysis. 
 
Table 3: Post-Stabilization Process Dataset 
Interview Data 
Total Number of Interviews  21 (17 board members + 4 officers of board) 
Duration of each Interview (range) 45 – 90 minutes 
Board Meetings (Aug ’07 – Aug ’10) 
Number of Audio Recordings 20 
Number of Meeting Minutes 20 
Periodicity of Meetings every even month (except one in Nov ‘07) 
Average Duration of Meetings 1h:21m:42s 
Average Number of Participants   10 – 11 participants (Board size has ranged from 21 to 23 
members over the period covered by dataset) 
Urban-net: Project Background     
Urban-net was funded by a New York state grant program. In a 1995 regulatory settlement with the state, 
Telco (pseudonymous broadband services provider) committed $50 million for broadband infrastructure 
in economically poor neighborhoods. A state-sponsored selection panel solicited proposals from consortia 
of public organizations (e.g., public schools), community-based organizations or CBOs (which are smaller 
non-profits), and small businesses via a competitive request for proposals (RFP) process.  Two rounds of 
grants resulted before program closure in 2000. In all twenty-two projects were funded.  
 
Users of program-funded networks paid subsidized service charges and were eligible for additional funds 
for user training or ICT upgrades. Telco, the sole program-designated broadband service provider, got 80 
per cent of every grant for infrastructure development. Telco would own the infrastructure. User sites got 
the remaining grant funds for ICT upgrades or training. User sites connected to the infrastructure, which 
would inter-connect them and also provide access to the Internet. 
 
Program selection panel members (hereafter selectors) hoped that the grant opportunity would motivate 
diverse agencies to propose how they would use the grant to “make a difference …in economic and social 
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terms” in poor neighborhoods. They saw program-funded networks as community networks promoting 
equity in Internet access in poor areas. Accordingly, the Urban-net project steering committee (which was 
later formalized in the Board of Directors) envisioned the Urban-net as an ICT-based community resource 
promoting equity and “serving the under-served”.  A new collective actor emerged from the organizations 
(public organizations and CBOs) and (a small number of) private citizens who constituted the committee, 
a collective progressive change agent working to “rewire” social structure to promote equity and “serve the 
under-served”. The project proposal, submitted to the program’s second round, won $3.8 million. 
Design Stabilization 
Design stabilization came about over three “transitions” – three major shifts in the social dynamics of the 
design process. The transitions occurred at design meetings 4, 6, and 8. Due to space restrictions we limit 
the discussion to the second and decisive third transitions (meetings 6 and 8).  
 
Starting around meeting # 5, the general managers who had represented the public organizations on the 
committee from project outset had their MIS managers attend design meetings in their place. Most MIS 
managers, however, seemed unaware of the project’s equity aims and were more concerned with reducing 
their broadband costs. By the time they joined the committee, the broadband services market had become 
competitive with new firms challenging Telco and targeting large user sites, like the public organizations, 
for their business. The dot.com boom was gathering strength and the new firms, like Telco, were investing 
heavily in broadband. Every firm wanted their business, and they decided to be opportunistic. 
 
The MIS managers were uninterested in the Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) cell relay services that 
were eligible for the program’s subsidized pricing. They were not familiar with ATM and were concerned 
about added costs from ICT upgrades and support skills that would be necessary. They were looking for a 
backward-compatible broadband service that would cut (not raise) their costs.      
 
The second transition was at meeting # 6, when the program notified the committee that gigabit Ethernet 
service too was eligible for the subsidized pricing. The announcement galvanized the MIS managers. They 
were now eager to sign up as Urban-net users. The service was perfect for linking their branch office LANs 
together, turning the Urban-net into a means for inter-connecting headquarters and branch locations and 
extending intra-organizational networks. One public organization estimated $150,000 in annual savings.  
Gigabit Ethernet’s back-compatibility with their ICTs would further help their bottom-line. 
 
The decisive third transition was at meeting # 8. The committee had received program notice that grants 
could be revoked if service contracts were not signed by early 2000. Reacting, some committee members 
(entrepreneurs) lobbied to stabilize the design by calling the notice a “crisis” that could only be averted 
with public organizations’ gigabit contracts. The equity aims highlighted in the proposal were sidelined.     
A Tale of Two Logics 
Equity in Internet access (computing access more generally) was a value that the Clinton Administration 
pursued in the 90s under its “Digital Divide” initiatives. In a series of reports, the government highlighted 
the gap between the digital haves and have-nots, and provided moral and financial support via programs 
to narrow the gap. Digital equity was framed as a “civil right”. The NY State grant program, established in 
the mid-nineties and influenced presumably by this rhetorical framing of equity as value and norm, made 
serving the under-served a critical “threshold factor” in evaluating proposals for funding. But then project 
delays began to mount during the design phase, and the program notified projects with the deadline. 
The entrepreneurs interpreted the program notice thus:  
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“We cannot have the Urban-net with just the smaller players. If there are no customers for the… 
more expensive services, we can forget about the money. The smaller players have seemed 
reluctant to jump in. The larger players seem more keen right now”. 
 
This rhetoric accomplished the following. First, it portrayed the notice as a crisis (“we can forget about 
the money”), a problem (the deadline) demanding immediate action. The project’s viability was at stake. 
This “crisis” characterization quickly became dominant, influencing subsequent committee deliberations.  
No one wished to abet grant revocation by second-guessing this portrayal. However, some members (here 
called dissidents) opposed the entrepreneurs’ solution to the crisis.  They reactivated equity (“You have to 
remember…it is the demographics of the city, its poor…that got us the grant in the first place. We cannot 
lose sight of that”). Controversially, they proposed a “tax”, asking public organizations to aid CBOs. They 
argued that while the program deadline was tight, there might be way to honor equity and safeguard the 
grant from revocation. But their objections were never discussed, and the “tax” idea was rejected. 
  
Second, it advocated a response. The crisis could only be averted by cashing in on MIS managers’ interest 
in gigabit Ethernet; Entrepreneurs argued that the public organizations “are all coming around because 
of gigabit Ethernet. Without this they are asking, why do we need to be a part of this”. Speedy action was 
critical: “They want to move quickly on this. They cannot wait”. MIS managers could abandon the project 
if the committee dithered on the entrepreneurs’ recommended response. Trying to include the CBOs was 
misplaced: contracts for cheap broadband services (services they could afford) would not avert revocation, 
and working with “reluctant” CBOs at this critical moment may time the grant out and kill the project. 
 
The “crisis” portrayal amplified the MIS managers’ influence on the committee by casting them as project 
saviors. Facilitating access to CBOs and their services via Urban-net was vital for realizing equity. If public 
organizations sourced social services the poor depended on, CBOs were the sites where residents accessed 
these resources. It was critical therefore that both public organizations and CBOs were on the Urban-net. 
The “crisis” characterization, in contrast, graded them per the new viability calculus: as users of “the more 
expensive services” public organizations were crucial now for project survival. The CBOs were less crucial 
right now: they could not help avert the “crisis”. 
 
A truce emerged. Entrepreneurs prevailed and dissidents acquiesced, only conditionally, to defer equity. 
The network design as stabilized in May 2000 privileges the MIS managers’ interest in a cheap solution 
for their intra-organizational connectivity needs. Thirteen public organizations currently use Urban-net, 
who use it to interconnect their head office and branch sites. There are over 200 network drops (network 
connections) across these 13 sites. CBOs are not on the Urban-net. Fiber optic lines connect sites to Telco 
switches via a point-to-point link, with Telco’s switching center (the Central Office) as the focal point and 
user site links radiating from it. As the sole service provider, Telco is the Urban-net’s center-piece. 
      
The stabilized design is held in place by Telco service contracts. The contracts’ five year term “freeze” the 
design over the contract term. Any change is subject to Telco penalties. All contracts are bilateral and are 
executed directly by users with Telco. The Board in 2000, like now, comprised between 21 - 23 members, 
with MIS managers in the majority, up to six officers, and up to four private citizen at-large members. 
 
The entrepreneurs exemplified certain “institution creating” actions (bolded) in Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006). Portraying the notice as a “crisis”, they successfully advocated for the business logic of viability 
over the communitarian logic of equity and defined the committee’s response to the notice, thereby also 
defining who would be on (public organizations) and off the Urban-net (CBOs). The “crisis” frame defined 
a boundary in temporal terms: CBOs could get on later, after the “crisis” passed. Equity was merely being 
deferred, not repudiated. This reassured the dissidents: the public organizations got on now; beyond lay 
the future, when equity could be realized. 
Organization Theory, Strategy and Information System 
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Entrepreneurs’ actions also involved identity construction (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Crises, real 
or imagined, can sharpen identity contests (DiMaggio 1997), and effective entrepreneurs use them to push 
for identity change as part of the response (Fligstein 2001). Leveraging the “crisis” framing, entrepreneurs 
promoted sound project management practice to ensure viability over equity/change agentry (“We’ve got 
to start managing this like a project now to avoid revocation”). This brief account of design stabilization 
is necessary background for making sense of maintenance work. 
Is There Life After Stabilization? Maintenance Work 
We pick up on the Urban-net in 2005. Shortly after design stabilization in 2000, negotiation of the first 
set of service contracts began. The process was staggered, with the first set of signatories being sites with 
little make-ready work to do. From the summer of 2005 until users renewed their first five-year contracts, 
Urban-net’s survival was in doubt. In 2000, the program-subsidized price for gigabit Ethernet service was 
substantially lower than the market rate. But in 2005, with contract renewals looming, rumors abounded 
that Telco would raise the price and change other contract terms. The rumors rattled users and prompted 
bilateral discussions with Telco rivals. Users were also looking at leaving the Urban-net and building their 
own infrastructure to meet their needs. Technology changes, increased availability of optical fiber capacity 
in the area, and market competition made these options more affordable than they used to be. The Urban-
net’s top officers (the Board’s Chair and Executive Director) in 2006, fearing the Urban-net’s dissolution 
from user defections, started exploring ways to keep users in and avert defections. In the event, although 
Telco raised prices they were still substantially below the market rate, and all contracts were renewed for 
five years. However, users’ frustration with Telco and the prospect of dissolution prompted discussions on 
Urban-net mission, governance, and future form. Today, one contract re-renewal later, these discussions 
are continuing in the Board. 
  
With contracts renewed, the Urban-net’s viability was extended by at least five years. But three issues that 
the Board had raised with Telco remained unresolved: freezing the subsidized pricing on gigabit Ethernet 
service, permitting users to move “drops” (network connections) within-site without change in subsidized 
pricing, and consolidation of bilateral service contracts under a master contract. A master contract would 
position the Board, as the Urban-net’s fiduciary agent representing all users, to negotiate with Telco from 
a position of strength by leveraging group buying power. Despite assurances, Telco failed to address these 
issues. Beginning in 2007, these irritants prompted users to publicly question the value of continuing with 
Telco and the project, renewing top officers’ dissolution fears when contracts expired in 2010-2011. So the 
first theme evident in Board meeting minutes we call “Keeping users in” (averting defections). 
 
A second theme is equity (“Serving the under-served”). Urban-net’s first Executive Director, who had held 
the position since project inception, stepped down in 2006. The incoming Executive Director, a veteran of 
the non-profit sector, was familiar with CBOs and the vital services they provided in poor neighborhoods. 
He was also committed to the project’s equity logic. His resolve to reactivate the logic was a key reason for 
its emergence in Board discussions on governance. In 2008, “serving the under-served” started showing 
up as a standing item on the formal agenda at Board meetings. 
Assuring Continued Viability 
This theme, first seen in entrepreneurs’ rhetoric in the design stabilization process, reemerged in 2005-
2006 during the first contract renewal and Telco’s unresponsiveness on the issues above. Urban-net’s top 
officers began looking for ways to embed and routinize (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) the Urban-net 
more deeply at user sites as insurance against defection. Embedding and routinizing involve tapping into 
the “stabilizing influence of embedded routines and repetitive practices” to assure on-going maintenance 
and reproduction (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Three such “insurance” strategies are being pursued. 
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User sites each have two interfaces to Urban-net: a VLAN connection and a community VLAN connection.  
Users use the VLAN connection to tie their branch and headquarter locations together. A virtual local area 
network (VLAN) interface emulates a direct LAN link between physically-remote users without going over 
a public network, thereby avoiding congestion and security challenges public networks can pose. Software 
switches at Telco Central Offices provide the emulation. The Urban-net’s unique value-add is high-speed 
connectivity over the VLAN, which, as a “dedicated” link between remote sites, can move data quickly and 
securely. The second interface is a “community VLAN” connection that links user sites to one another and 
the Internet. Currently, however, the community VLAN is used almost exclusively for Internet access, not 
cross-site connectivity. Belying the high level of interest in cross-site connectivity at project outset, actual 
cross-site connectivity has historically been very low. 
 
Consequently, top officers’ efforts to embed and routinize Urban-net have targeted the community VLAN 
interface. Two strategies are being pursued. The first is to get users “to increase their Internet bandwidth” 
(August meeting, 2007). Because of demand aggregation over the community VLAN and bulk buying, the 
Urban-net has been able to negotiate highly competitive Internet access rates for users. If usage could be 
further increased, the bulk-discounted rates would be even lower all around. 
  
A second strategy is to get users to use the community VLAN more for cross-site connectivity. Some users 
readily saw the community VLAN as Urban-net’s unique value-add, something that no other network was 
equipped to provide: “our ability to connect other institutions into the Community VLAN and act as a hub 
to facilitate… (inter-connections) is really our key asset” (April meeting, 2010). Another member saw the 
value-add being community networking over “dedicated” high-speed linkages. Despite such sentiments, 
however, top officers have struggled to increase community VLAN use for cross-site connectivity. Users 
cite lack of resources to develop the necessary applications. One proposal that the Board has considered is 
for Urban-net to host widely-used office applications that users would access over the community VLAN. 
Another is to host and manage healthcare data-sets on behalf of hospitals and medical labs. To the extent 
that users came to depend on secure, high-speed access to critical resources that the Urban-net, by means 
of the community VLAN, was uniquely equipped to provide, defection was less likely. 
 
A third strategy to embed and routinize Urban-net has been to persuade users to use their VLAN interface 
as transport for vital operations, like off-site, mission-critical data back-up and recovery. Institutionalists 
have used contagion as a metaphor to argue that artifacts that are embedded in institutionalized practices 
are likely themselves to become institutionalized as a consequence (Jepperson 1991). If Urban-net could 
be positioned as an indispensable fixture of users’ on-site ICT infrastructure and work routines that relied 
heavily on access to mission-critical data, top officers reasoned, users were more likely to take Urban-net’s 
ROI (return-on-investment) for granted. Eight years after design stabilization in 2000, the business value 
to users of being connected to Urban-net required clarification, as we show below; it did not yet have the 
taken-for-granted quality that institutionalized phenomena come to have (Jepperson 1991). 
       
At the October 2008 meeting, a member asked what value users received from membership. The technical 
officer responded: “the real benefit…has come from participation in the (grant program) and the ability to 
save substantial money (sic) on network connections (and) Internet connectivity”. The Executive Director 
highlighted the value “from group representation in negotiations with Telco, (and) collection and sharing 
of information and (collective) solutions to problems”.  The member argued that the “Board…needs to do 
a better job of explaining the value that members receive” in return for their “annual investment” – users’ 
financial contribution to Urban-net over and above service charges (which are payable directly to Telco). 
This annual investment, originally called the assessment fee, is now called the baseline fee. Questions on 
the Urban-net’s value proposition had come up previously too. The Executive Director described it thus in 
his 2007 annual report, highlighting the savings despite Telco’s price hike at the first contract renewal: 
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“Currently each of the Urban-net participants (sic) are paying on average $327 per month per 
location. The current Telco tariff (market rate) for a Gigabit Ethernet connection is $2,500 per 
month per location.  By participating in the Urban-net, members are paying on average $3,924 
annually per location.  Without the (grant program), Urban-net members would pay $30,000 
annually per location”. 
 
The report went on to note that Urban-net “took a major step toward long term financial stability and a 
fairer method of assessing participating members for support by moving from a Flat Rate Revenue Model 
to a Benefit Assessment Model”. The new model would take effect in 2009; 2008 was to be a “transitional 
year”. The financial officer elaborated on the value-add from the Benefit Assessment Model (August 2008 
meeting), which would 
 
“more fairly reflect the cost savings benefits received by individual members…(in 2009) Urban-
net will move from a flat assessment model of $4,000 per member to a flat assessment of 
$2,500 plus $20 monthly fee per Gig-E connection model in 2009 up to a maximum of 20 Gig-E 
connections, resulting in a more equitable assessment based on money saved by each member”. 
 
The annual baseline fee, initially assessed at $3,000 per user, subsequently went up to $4,000 per year. 
In 2009 the fee dropped to $2,500 annually as part of a “more equitable” assessment, under which users 
would only pay for 20 gigabit Ethernet connections; connections over and above this number would cost 
them nothing. This new scheme was intended to incentivize increased use of Urban-net while also helping 
users’ realize more value for their money. Efforts by top officers to highlight the benefits of membership – 
benefits that were not yet self-evident to members -- have a flavor of what Lawrence and Suddaby  (2006) 
call valorizing actions necessary in maintenance work, with membership and the right to use Urban-net, a 
right tightly regulated via Telco service contracts and defined by the grant program rules, being the object 
valorized. It was critical to keep users in and assure continued viability in order “to do the things we really 
want to do: serve the under-served”, as the outgoing Executive Director put it in 2006, neatly linking the 
viability and equity logics in a policy guideline for the Board. He saw the need for the logics to co-exist.    
Reactivating Equity 
The assessment fee, adopted in 2005-2006 around the time of the first contract renewal, was an echo of 
the then controversial “tax” idea proposed by dissidents before design stabilization occurred in 2000. The 
assessment fee was intended partly to help “under-served” CBOs get connected. Interestingly, dissidents’ 
argument that the “tax” would only be a small fraction of what public organizations stood to save from the 
subsidized service charges finds an echo in the 2007 annual report, where the Executive Director noted: 
  
“Under this (new) assessment model (referring to the Benefit Assessment Model above), each 
organization, based on their annual savings, would be asked to contribute a portion of those 
savings to the support of the Urban-net in order to ensure that the organization is able to 
achieve its goals…of using telecommunications to positively impact our community”. 
 
The Executive Director has been a vocal champion on the Board pushing for equity as part of his vision of 
how Urban-net could “positively impact our community”. This is a recurring sentiment in Board meetings 
and is part of a complex set of strategies motivating a new Board membership structure and categories of 
membership intended to involve “a broader spectrum of representatives of the community…as we expand 
our efforts to assist the under-served” (April 2009 meeting). 
 
In 2008, the Board started deliberating ways to address the Urban-net’s equity aims by effecting changes 
to the by-laws to double the number of at-large members; a second strategy was to constitute a new body, 
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the “community net committee”, as a “mechanism for involving the community and (sic) their interests”. 
These governance initiatives were intended to include hitherto unrepresented interests on the Board and 
were prompted by the strategically significant recognition that the Board, given the project’s equity aims, 
should hold itself accountable to the community at large, not just to its membership.  
 
At the October 2008 meeting, the Executive Director reported on a previous Board discussion on getting 
“a broader base of individuals from the community involved in the Board”. The best way to do this was by 
doubling the at-large member positions from four to eight. Importantly, according to the by-laws, at-large 
members need not come from Urban-net user sites. Private citizens could be appointed to the Board; the 
four at-large members that have served on the Board so far have all been private citizens. The move now 
was to have up to eight private citizens as at-large members. Effecting this change would require a formal 
change to the by-laws. At the April 2009 meeting the proposed change was approved unanimously by the 
Board. This was a significant, even historic, change. At-large members would have the same voting rights 
as other members, who represent the user sites. If all eight at-large members (out of a total membership 
of around 27 with the four new positions added) voted as a bloc on policy issues of community-wide 
import, they could take Urban-net in a new direction.  
 
A second, related strategy proposed is to expand membership categories in order to bring “a wide variety 
of organizations together for their… benefit and the benefit of the…community” (Executive Director at the 
February 2010 meeting). Crucial to this expansion is differentiating the Urban-net “corporation” from the 
Urban-net “organization”. Membership in the “corporation” is controlled by by-laws. The “organization” 
would offer “additional types of membership…and allow participation by and input from” diverse voices 
but without voting rights. How “organization” and “corporation” would relate legally is being worked out. 
   
A third strategy to tap into a plurality of voices in governing Urban-net is the “community net committee”. 
A committee by this name was in fact set up by the Board in 2007 but had become inactive. The doubling 
of at-large members on the Board from four to eight was intended to increase community representation 
in the Urban-net “corporation”. The object behind reviving the “community net committee”, as envisioned 
in Board meetings in 2009-2010, was to provide an additional avenue for “under-served” interests via the 
Urban-net “organization”. The committee would be an independent entity, with its chair having a seat on 
the Urban-net Board as an at-large member to provide a link between the two bodies. The mission of the 
committee would be to identify and address community needs while helping to strengthen the Urban-net 
Board’s renewed focus on the “under-served” and its commitment to broader vision of accountability. 
 
In its ongoing work on member rights, structure, and categories, the Board, with the Executive Director 
serving as the leading advocate for reactivating the equity logic in the Board deliberations, has gone much 
farther than the “tax” envisioned by the dissidents. The Board’s initiatives, if fully implemented, promise 
to bring under-represented interests directly into the Board’s policy-making processes. However, these 
initiatives would require no changes to the technology infrastructure or service contracts. Unlike these 
conservative moves aimed at preserving Urban-net while amending it, the two strategies discussed below 
to “reduce dependence on Telco” are far more radical in their envisioning of the Urban-net’s future form. 
Looking for Ways to “Reduce Dependence on Telco” 
As we noted earlier, the Board has unsuccessfully petitioned Telco to freeze prices, permit users to move 
drops, and to move to a master service contract. A recent resolution endorsed unanimously by the Board 
called attention to these still-unresolved issues and pushed for a vendor-independent and wholly-owned 
infrastructure. Over the two contract renewals thus far Telco had nearly doubled gigabit Ethernet service 
charges (these are still lower than market rates though), and restrictions against moving drops are still in 
place. In light of these unresolved irritants, and to give itself time to analyze alternative futures before the 
next round of contract renewals in 2015-2016, the Board resolved to continue to explore “creation of a… 
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telecommunications utility”, to be owned and run by Urban-net or other community entity, which would 
be “economically and functionally advantageous” to current users and the community at large. 
 
The Chair called the resolution “historic”, but the seeds of a radical envisioning date back to 2005-2006 
(to the first contract renewal) and have sprouted now and again since. At the October 2007 meeting, the 
Chair had announced, as a Board initiative for 2008, that 
 
“drops that we had not taken advantage of under the (program-subsidized) pricing are no 
longer available and that is a key reason why the Urban-net, under our strategic planning 
initiative, is looking at ways of installing new and/or utilizing existing fiber in the future… while 
reducing our dependence on a single vendor (emphasis added)”. 
 
The financial officer elaborated on this at the October 2009 meeting, laying out two future options: the 
“value-added reseller” model and a more radical model, where Urban-net would “own and manage” its 
own fiber network independent of Telco or other providers. The Board’s objective, he said, 
  
“is to examine a number of different alternatives to arrive at a long term plan that is in the best 
interest of the community. The most ideal alternative would be for us to own and manage our 
own fiber network. Short of that, if we could become something like a value-added reseller… this 
would reduce the ongoing threat of significantly increased pricing every five years”. 
 
The “value-added reseller” model would entail leveraging Urban-net’s “meet-me” switches. In the process 
of design stabilization in 2000, a new local broadband start-up (and Telco rival) persuaded the committee 
to allow it to bid to build Urban-net. What followed was unprecedented: Urban-net was the only project of 
the 22 projects funded state-wide to put out a request for proposals (RFP) from Telco and its competitors. 
Telco and the start-up’s bids were successful and each secured roughly 50% of the 13 user sites now on the 
Urban-net. The committee used grant money earmarked for ICT upgrades/user training to install a switch 
(the “meet-me” switch) where Telco’s half of Urban-net and the start-up’s half would inter-connect. The 
“meet-me” switch was located at a neutral site. Urban-net owned and managed the switch. But by the time 
design stabilization occurred in 2000, the start-up had gone bankrupt and its half of user sites returned to 
Telco. Now that Telco was the sole provider, the “meet-me” switch was little used. However, it emerged as 
a focus of renewed interest in the Board as a way to reduced dependence on Telco. The frustrations of the 
contract renewal process prompted in Board members the sentiment that “maybe we kiss Telco goodbye” 
and either replace Telco with another service provider or force Telco to compete with others for providing 
services through the “meet-me” switch. For various reasons, by 2007 there were three “meet-me” switches 
at different locations, and they were being used to connect Urban-net users over the community VLAN to 
back-up Internet service providers. 
 
The “value -added reseller” model looks well beyond Internet service. The Board would leverage “meet 
me” switches to resell all services, using competition to drive down charges. For a fee payable to Urban-
net, service providers would connect to the switches. Telco would cease to be the sole provider and would 
have to compete with rivals for the Urban-net’s business. Leveraging the “meet-me” switches in this way 
would radically shift the balance of power, locating them at the Urban-net’s very heart – its centerpiece – 
with the Board as the sole decision-maker. The Board would set policy, price points and, as Urban-net’s 
fiduciary agent, leverage group buying to negotiate the best terms from service providers. 
 
Concurrent with the thinking on the “value-added reseller” model and consistent with “strategic planning 
initiative” to reduce dependence on Telco (the Executive Director described this as a “key initiative for the 
organization in 2008”), the Board in 2009 was strategizing to bring political pressure on Telco to resolve 
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the three outstanding irritants discussed earlier. That year, Telco was negotiating a franchise deal with the 
city to provide TV services. The Board seized this as an opportunity to pressure Telco through the Mayor’s 
office. However, shortly after this meeting Telco decided to drop its franchise bid, so that point of leverage 
was no longer available.  But the December meeting surfaced other ideas to bring pressure on Telco to be 
more responsive to Urban-net and resolve the outstanding issues, in particular service pricing. One was to 
“start negotiations with Telco by stating a price” users were willing to pay “rather than asking what it will 
cost”. Another was to solicit a bid from a Telco competitor “to give us leverage in negotiations” with Telco. 
This idea had been suggested earlier, in August 2009, where one member suggested forming “a working 
team of the top three or four users... to deal with Telco on behalf of all members. The next steps would be 
to… solicit competitive bids, develop a list of when all contracts are due to expire, then develop a 
strategy to bring Telco to the table and stress that we are looking for a solution now”. The recurring 
motif is “gaining leverage” to negotiate with Telco from a position of strength. Bypassing Telco entirely is 
the more radical option, as the financial officer had noted in the October 2009 meeting (“the most ideal 
alternative would be for us to own and manage our own fiber”). The unanimous passage of the “historic” 
resolution showed the appeal of this option on the Board. Irrespective of which of these options (the 
ownership option or the “value-added reseller” option) ends up being pursued, Urban-net will be radically 
different than it is today: in its technology infrastructure, governance structure, and the user populations 
it serves.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
We traced the Urban-net from the project’s inception to design stabilization in 2000, and from then to the 
work now occurring on the Board to maintain the Urban-net while amending it. Through three transition 
points, in particular the second and the definitive third transitions, the project’s equity logic got deferred 
in favor of project viability. If the network planning process (user requirements analysis) helped flesh out 
an inclusive image of Urban-net as a true community resource promoting  equity and inter-organizational 
connectivity among large and small entities, the design specifications stabilized in 2000 fleshed out a very 
different, circumscribed image, with large entities (public organizations) as sole users using Urban-net for 
intra-organizational, not inter-organizational, connectivity, and excluding CBOs and their service areas. 
 
The Board’s initiatives to “keep users in” and realize equity were both seeded in 2005-2006, around the 
first contract renewal; the efforts to cut dependence on Telco also had their early origins in the frustration 
experienced by users at this time. We identified three strategies to assure Urban-net’s continued viability 
by keeping users in: two involving the community VLAN interface and the third, the VLAN interface. We 
identified three strategies on the equity front as well, all focused on diversifying governance: doubling the 
number of at-large members, reactivating the “community net committee”, and new member categories in 
the Urban-net “organization”. Initiatives to reduce dependence on Telco are being explored on two fronts: 
complete independence via ownership, and the “value-added reseller” model. Our focus here has been on 
the “concrete practices” of actors doing institutional work, as recommended by Lawrence et al. (2009). 
        
In their efforts to cut dependence on Telco, the Board is acting in order-challenging ways by envisioning 
radical alternatives to Urban-net’s current form. The individual actors involved – the Executive Director, 
Financial Officer, the Board Chair, as well as several members – in this radical effort are entrepreneurs, 
leading deliberations on strategy. Like their forerunners in the stabilization process, these entrepreneurs 
have used advocacy, with the Chair, Executive Director, and Financial Officer favoring ownership and 
leading the effort to get the “historic” resolution passed and authorizing funds for the feasibility study. 
They defined the Board’s response to Telco unresponsiveness, but agreed to look at the “value-added 
reseller” option in the study. As part of their groundwork on the resolution, the Chair and the Executive 
Director met with Telco rivals, community-owned community networks, institutional network operators, 
and experts, seeding a network of resource-persons and resources they could activate for the feasibility 
study and beyond. The Executive Director advocated inclusion of language on “serving the under-served” 
in the “historic” resolution. 
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As we noted earlier, the bulk of the maintenance work now occurring, however, is far more modest and is 
concerned with “amending while preserving” the Urban-net. It is gardening work. “Keeping users in” and 
“serving the under-served” account for the bulk of the deliberations. On the first, top officers and selected 
members are concerned with matters operational: cutting Internet costs, equipment upgrades, and service 
level agreements. On the second, it is administrative and concerns governance, legal, and budgets issues. 
In both cases, it is largely committee work. Entrepreneurs must work with the Board to gain concurrence 
on concrete action plans; consensus cannot be assumed and compromise is common. Maintenance work 
is difficult but mundane in a double sense: “keeping users in” is basically order-reproducing work. Even in 
the case of “serving the under-served”, the entrepreneurs, led by the Executive Director, were reactivating 
a deferred logic, not creating one. It is mundane in a second sense, involving “adjustments, adaptations, 
and compromises” (Lawrence et al. 2009) common in committee work. Focusing on the actual work that 
actors must do maintain artifacts, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) rightly note, is to highlight actors’ skill 
and artfulness and also to the contingent and expedient nature of such work. The image of the actor here 
in hardly the “hyper-muscular” agent that Lawrence et al. (2009) caution against. Gardening assumes a 
purposeful actor who may guide thinking but who may not be in control of all the details (Olsen 2003). 
 
The metaphor of gardening – amending while preserving – captures the conservative thrust of much of 
the maintenance work we report, as its concern is with preserving valued aspects of stabilized artifacts. 
Amending in this case involved reactivation (not creation), similar to Hargrave and van de Ven’s (2009) 
finding on actors “carry(ing) over norms from the previous regime into… the new institutional order”. 
Just as a gardener prunes, weeds, plants/re-plants to keep the garden in good order while amending it, 
maintenance workers may “creatively combine” (Jarzabkowski et al. 2009) attempts at innovation and 
also disruption. Gardening (Olsen 2003) elegantly captures the multi-stranded nature of maintenance. 
       
We differentiated stabilization from maintenance on their temporal and relational scope. Temporally, 
stabilization is an event occurring at a point in time. There may be a process involved as we reported, but 
there comes a point when a set of design specifications emerges with a degree of concurrence from stake-
holders, and this set then serves as the basis on which the system is built. In Bijker’s (1997) formulation, 
the plurality of interpretations of the artifact as entertained by stakeholders diminishes at this point and 
the artifact’s “interpretive flexibility” is reduced, and major change to specifications is unlikely to occur. In 
systems engineering practice, systems designers rely on user sign-offs on requirements to start specifying 
the design, and the stabilized set of specifications - traceable to the stabilized set of requirements - then 
drives system development. Freezing requirements and rapid applications development are among the IS 
practices used to stabilize a set of specification so the system can be built (Davidson 2002). 
 
Temporally speaking, maintenance work, in contrast, is ongoing and concerned with maintaining that 
which has been stabilized (or aspects thereof). Relationally, as evidenced by the Board’s efforts to serve 
the “under-served”, actors are working with local groups, private citizens, non-profits, and institutional 
representatives and funding agencies to identify at-large members for the Board and fill seats on the other 
two bodies as well: the “community net committee” and the Urban-net “organization”. The Board is in the 
process of defining a broad-based relational network of new stakeholders, sources of funding, normative 
control, and public oversight and monitoring (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) in line with an expansive 
new sense of accountability to the community. Efforts to keep users in have also entailed network-seeding 
parleys with Internet service providers and Telco rivals. Similar to constructing normative networks 
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006), this is activity “through which practices become normatively sanctioned”. 
It also provides the Board social learning and business development opportunities. These networks could 
also be tapped if the (more radical) ownership or “value-added reseller” option is pursued, but right now, 
for the most part, these initiatives support the Board’s ongoing maintenance work, or gardening. 
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